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court rejected plaintiffs' claim that section 78(8) of the Ethics in
Government Act violated their state and federal constitutional due
process right to practice law. The court held that a hindrance in
marketability does not interfere with the ability to practice
law. 2 O4
5
People v. Vilardi 2°

(decided May 10, 1990)

A defendant convicted of first degree arson claimed, on appeal,
that his right to due process of law under the state 20 6 and
federal 207 constitutions had been violated by the prosecution's
failure to disclose specifically requested exculpatory Brady
20 8
material.
The court of appeals held that the failure to disclose the exculpatory evidence was reversible error and that defendant was entifled to a new trial. More importantly, the court, in a close decision, held that the applicable New York standard "to measure
materiality, where the prosecutor was made aware by a specific
discovery request that defendant considered the material important to the defense," 2 09 remains that there be "a showing of a
'reasonable possibility' that the failure to disclose the exculpatory
report contributed to the verdict.",2 10 This New York formulation
expresses a departure from the federal standard announced in
United States v. Bagley, 2 11 which requires a showing that the
undisclosed evidence is material only if "there is a reasonable
204. Ford, 75 N.Y.2d at 614, 554 N.E.2d at 884, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
205. 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990).
206. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
207. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
208. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady material is
exculpatory evidence which meets three criteria: 1) it must be evidence
favorable to the defendant; 2) defense counsel must have made a demand to
review that material; and 3) the prosecution must have knowledge of the
material prior to the trial. See Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 73, 555 N.E.2d at 917,
556 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
209. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 77, 555 N.E.2d at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
210. Id.
211. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
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probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different." ' 2 12 The
New York standard is based on independent state constitutional
2 13
grounds and is a continuation of the existing New York rule.
Prior to Bagley, the federal rule and the New York rule were the
same.
The defendant in Vilardi was convicted of first degree arson,
first degree attempted arson, and conspiracy in having planted
and set off pipe bombs in both a pizzeria and a laundromat in
Brooklyn. 2 14 The prosecution's bomb squad witness was Officer
Daniel Kiely, who had inspected the basement of the laundromat
the day after the explosions. The bomb in the pizzeria had never
exploded. Because first degree arson requires a showing of
damages that were caused by the explosion, the laundromat
2 15
findings were crucial to the defendant's case.
Defendant's co-conspirators had been tried first in a separate
proceeding. At their trial, although Kiely testified that he ultimately concluded that the laundromat bomb had exploded (based
on his reinspection of the premises one year after the incident),
upon cross-examination it was revealed that his initial report
(made one day after the incident) had concluded that he had not
2 16
uncovered any evidence of an explosion in the laundromat.
Thus, the defendant's co-conspirators were acquitted of first
degree arson charges.
Upon preparing for defendant's trial, counsel had requested
from the prosecution all reports made by "ballistic, firearm and
explosive experts." ' 2 17 The prosecutor sent twelve reports to
counsel, but failed to send a copy of Officer Kiely's initial
212. Vlardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 84, 555 N.E.2d at 925, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
213. A majority of the court of appeals adopted the New York standard on

separate state grounds. Judges Simons, Wachtler and Bellacosa, although
concurring in the judgment, would have found reversible error under the
Bagley standard which they would have adopted as the New York rule. Id. at

77, 555 N.E.2d at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
214. Id. at 69-70, 555 N.E.2d at 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
215. Id. at 70, 555 N.E.2d at 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
216. Id. at 70, 555 N.E.2d at 916, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
217. Id.
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report, which was made the day after the incident. Defendant was
convicted of all charges, including the first degree arson charge.
On appeal, he contended that the absence of this report violated
18
his due process rights. 2
The appellate division reasoned, and a majority of the judges of
the court of appeals agreed, that the specific request made by the
defendant placed a higher burden on the prosecutor to disclose
the requested material than would have existed if no request had
been made. When a defendant specifically requests material and
does not receive it, he is led to believe that the material does not
exist. The defendant may then alter his trial strategy based on this
erroneous belief. This type of error is "seldom, if ever, excusable" and verges on prosecutorial misconduct. 2 19 The Bagley
standard of materiality abandons any distinction between cases
where requests for exculpatory evidence are specifically made
and those where no requests at all are made. 220 The Vilardi court
declined to accept a standard that offers less protection to the
individual defendant than was currently offered under the state
218. Id. at 71, 55 N.E.2d at 916, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 519. In Brady, the

Court explained the theory for the interrelationship between the failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence and the due process requirements of the

fourteenth amendment:
It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice
and hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of
a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of
liberty through deliberate deception of court and jury ....

Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,
112 (1935)).
219. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 74, 555 N.E.2d at 918, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
The court cited People v. Brown, 67 N.Y.2d 555, 496 N.E.2d 663, 505
N.Y.S.2d 574 (1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1093 (1987) and People v.
Cwikla, 46 N.Y.2d 434, 386 N.E.2d 1079, 414 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1979). This

reasoning mirrors the Supreme Court reasoning in United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97 (1976), which created a two tier approach which imposed a lesser
burden on defendant in a "specific request" case where the prosecution is put
on notice "that there is particular evidence the defense does not have and
believes to be important." Wlardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 73-74, 555 N.E.2d at 918,
556 N.Y.S.2d at 521.

220. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 75, 555 N.E.2d at 919, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
In essence, the court of appeals is choosing to remain with the Agurs
formulation.
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constitution.
Judge Simons, joined by Chief Judge Wachtler and Judge
Bellacosa in a concurring opinion, affirmed the reversal and
concluded that the defendant was entitled to the undisclosed
evidence. However, the concurring judges would not have
departed from the federal standard. According to the
concurrence, the court is disregarding the "Supreme Court's
decision merely because it disagrees with them or dislikes the
result reached.,, 2 21 Recognizing that the state court is empowered
to reach its own rulings on matters of state constitutional law,
Judge Simons reasoned that New York has in actuality no
"constitutional rules on Brady material independent of Federal
precedents." 222 Because of this, Judge Simons concluded that the
court cannot find an independent state ground for departure from
the federal rule.
The concurring opinion offers "noninterpretative considerations" necessary for determining when the state court under its
own constitution may depart from a federal constituional decision. 223 This is relevant to the decision in this case because the
federal due process clause and the New York State due process
224
clause do not vary significantly in either language or intent.
Other state decisions that depart from Supreme Court holdings
have fallen into three categories: "1) we chose to adhere to our
own established law... 2) to establish a more protective State
right by constitutionalizing a prior fully developed common law
right or 3) because we found a separate state rule justified by
221. Id. at 80, 555 N.E.2d at 922, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 525 (Simons, J.,
concurring).

222. Id. at 85, 555 N.E.2d at 925, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 528 (Simons, J.,
concurring). The majority's independent state ground was not based on Brady
material specifically, but on prior cases dealing with prosecutorial use of false

and misleading testimony.
223. Id. at 80, 555 N.E.2d at 922, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 525 (Simons, J.,

concurring).
224. Id. The court cited People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375, 515 N.E.2d
898, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1987) as holding that the federal and state due
process clauses do not materially differ and hence are not subject to
inconsistent analysis. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 80, 555 N.E.2d at 922, 556

N.Y.S.2d at 525.
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concerns peculiar to New York State residents." ' 225 Thus, the
concurrence found no analytical basis for departures from the
federal rule since exculpatory evidence does not fit into any of
the above three categories and the New York due process clause
does not materially vary from the federal clause. Accordingly,
the concurring Judges concluded that departing from the federal
rule is invalid and likely to create "instability and uncertainty in
6
our law." 22
Prior to Bagley and the "reasonable probability" standard, federal constitutional law was based on the Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland.227 Brady established "that the prosecution's failure to disclose to the defense evidence in its possession both favorable and material to the defense entitles the defendant to a new trial.'"228 Brady involved "evidence that had been
specifically requested by the defense.'"229 It was uncertain, however, if the "specific request for the exculpatory evidence" was
230
an "indispensable element 6f a Brady claim."
Later, in United States v. Agurs,2 31 the Supreme Court
"created a two-tiered framework for determining whether
favorable evidence was 'material,' '"232 such that non-disclosure
of it would require a new trial. Under this framework,
specifically requested evidence "was material if it 'might have
affected the outcome of the trial.'-233
"[I]n cases where there had been no request or, only a general
request for exculpatory material, . . . undisclosed exculpatory

evidence was material only if it 'create[d] a reasonable doubt that
225. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 83, 555 N.E.2d at 924, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 527
(Simons, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see People v. P.J. Video, 68
N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986).
226. Id. at 86, 555 N.E.2d at 926, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 529 (Simons, J.,
concurring).
227. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

228. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 73, 555 N.E.2d at 919, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
229. Id.

230. Id. (emphasis in original).
231. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).

232. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 73, 555 N.E.2d at 917, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
233. Id. at 73, 555 N.E.2d at 918, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 521. (quoting Agurs,
427 U.S. at 104).
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did not otherwise exist.' 2' 3 4 The Agurs court found a failure to
respond to a specific and relevant request "seldom, if ever,
excusable." 2 35 In Bagley the Supreme Court reconsidered the
Agurs approach and replaced it with a single test for all cases "undisclosed evidence is material only if there is a 'reasonable
probability that it 'would' have altered the outcome of the
trial. -9236

The court of appeals rejected the new federal Bagley standard,
basing its decision on its own state jurisprudence, and concluding
that the state constitution has its own requirements for a fair trial.
The court cited New York cases pre-dating the federal Brady
case 2 37 that dealt with similar questions "of knowing
[which]
prosecutorial use of false and misleading testimony, ...
were decided entirely without reference to Federal law, based on
[its] own view... "238 of what a fair trial requires. "We have
long emphasized that our view of due process in this area is, in
large measure, predicated both upon 'elemental fairness' to the
defendant, and upon concern that the prosecutor's office
discharge its ethical and professional obligations." 23 9 Following
these "long-standing State concerns," 240 the court of appeals
stated that its standard has long been "premised on Agurs, and..
. has been understood and cited again and again as the governing
standard throughout the State." 24 1 Therefore, the court declined
to abandon it in favor of Bagley. The court mentioned that the
new federal Bagley standard is "hardly clear" and has created
considerable confusion in its application. 242 By contrast, the
234. Id. (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112).
235. Id. at 74, 555 N.E.2d at 918, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 521 (citing Agurs, 427
U.S. at 106).
236. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 74, 555 N.E.2d at 918, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 521
(quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
237. Brady was based on prior federal cases similar to the New York cases
the court relies on here.
238. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 75, 555 N.E.2d at 919, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 522
(citations omitted).
239. Id. at 76, 555 N.E.2d at 919, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Van Pelt, 76 N.Y.2d. at 78, 555 N.E.2d at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
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court of appeals has determined that the New York standard
encourages heightened "prosecutorial care" 243' in responding to
discovery requests and establishes a clear standard.
People v. Van Pelt244
(decided June 5, 1990)

A criminal defendant contended that his due process rights under the federal24 5 and state 246 constitutions were violated when
he, upon retrial before a new trial judge, received a harsher
sentence than originally imposed by the first trial judge. 247 The
court held that the defendant's procedural due process rights were
violated.248

A jury convicted defendant of first and second degree armed
robbery, and the trial judge sentenced defendant to concurrent
terms of five to ten years and four to eight years. The appellate
division reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial
judge failed to instruct the jury that the prosecution had to disprove the defendant's alibi beyond a reasonable doubt. 24 9 Upon
retrial, before a new trial judge, defendant was again convicted
of first and second degree armed robbery. However, this judge
imposed increased concurrent terms of seven and one half to fifteen years and six to twelve years. The trial judge imposed a
harsher sentence because he believed that the defendant coerced
his sister and brother-in-law into establishing an unbelievable alibi, and because a complaining witness was forced to come back
to court to testify, thereby reliving the trauma of the incident. 250
In a unanimous decision, the court of appeals held that the imposition of a harsher sentence by a trial judge creates a presump243. Id.
244. 76 N.Y.2d 156, 556 N.E.2d 423, 556 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1990).
245. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
246. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
247. Van Pelt, 76 N.Y.2d at 161, 556 N.E.2d at 425, 556 N.Y.S.2d at

986.
248. Id. at 158, 556 N.E.2d at 424, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
249. Id. at 158-59, 556 N.E.2d at 424, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
250. Id. at 159, 556 N.E.2d at 424, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
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